

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 AEC-11 IO-14 EB-11 OIC-04

OMB-01 AECE-00 DRC-01 /175 W  
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P R 141616Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1028

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 0042

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 10347

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: AN OVERVIEW

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE FOLLOWING IS THE US  
MBFR DELEGATION'S EVALUATION OF THE THE VIENNA NEGOTIA-  
TIONS UP TO THE MID-DECEMBER BREAK AND ITS ANALYSIS  
OF THE STARTING POINT FOR THE TALKS IN THE NEW YEAR.

2. THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE VIENNA TALKS, BOTH IN  
EAST-WEST DISCUSSIONS AND IN AD HOC GROUP WORK, HAS  
BEEN GENERALLY GOOD AND CONDUCIVE TO CONSTRUCTIVE  
WORKING RELATIONSHIPS. THE SOVIETS HAVE DEMONSTRATED  
A CERTAIN SERIOUSNESS OF APPROACH AND AN APPARENT  
DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE A REDUCTION AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH  
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ON TERMS THAT WIDELY DIVERGE FROM THE ALLIED AP-

PROACH. THE SOVIETS SEEM INTERESTED IN SPEED NEGOTIATIONS RESULTING ESSENTIALLY IN EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS. THEY HAVE INSISTED ON THE INCLUSION IN REDUCTIONS OF NATIONAL FORCES, PARTICULARLY

THE BUNDESWEHR, AND OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. EAST EUROPEANS PARTICIPANTS, WHILE INCLUDING SOME NATIONAL FLAVOR IN THEIR PRESENTATIONS, HAVE BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO STRAY FROM THE SOVIET LINE. ALLIED COHESION HAS HELD UP WELL SO FAR, BUT GREATER TESTS OF ALLIED UNITY WILL COME AS THE NEGOTIATIONS GET DOWN TO MORE SPECIFIC BARGAINING. THE ALLIES ARE FACED BY A CHOICE BETWEEN SEEKING TO EXPLOIT INDICATIONS OF EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS AN INITIAL FOCUS ON US-SOVIET FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY STIFF EASTERN CONDITIONS FOR DOING SO OR TO PROCEED TO DEVELOP IN DETAIL COMPONENTS OF THEIR PHASE I PROGRAM WHILE LEAVING IT FOR THE EAST TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO JOIN AN ACTIVE DIALOGUE. END SUMMARY.

3. ATMOSPHERICS. RELATIONS BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN DELEGATIONS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN AMICABLE AND BUSINESSLIKE FROM THE OUTSET. THE SOVIETS HAVE SET THE TONE FOR THE EASTERN SIDE, GENERALLY AVOIDING POLEMIC LANGUAGE IN BOTH PLENARY AND BILATERAL COMMENTARIES ON THE WESTERN APPROACH. THE SOLE EXCEPTION HAS BEEN THE EAST GERMAN DELEGATION, WHICH HAS ASSUMED A LESS COM-PROMISING AND SLIGHTLY POLEMICAL STANCE. THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES FOR THEIR PART, HAVE DELIBERATELY AVOIDED PROVOCATIVE FORMULATIONS. THE EAST DISPLAYED SOME IRRITATION AT WESTERN REFERENCES TO THE POTENTIALLY OFFENSIVE ORIENTATION OF EASTERN FORCES, BUT HAVE NOT PRESSED THE POINT.

4. THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE AD HOC GROUP HAS BEEN CONDUCIVE TO CONSTRUCTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS. THE GROUP CONTINUED FROM THE OUTSET TO APPLY THE INFORMAL WORK STYLE AND PROCEDURES DEVELOPED IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS. NONE OF THE IRRITANTS

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THAT HAVE TROUBLED THE ALLIANCE GENERALLY -- SUCH AS DISAPPROVAL OF SOME NATO MEMBERS OF THE GREEK REGIME AND IRRITATION WITH US CONSULTATIONS DURING THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS -- HAVE THUS FAR AFFECTED THE WORK OF THE GROUP. THE FREQUENT PLENARY SESSIONS AND THE OPEN-ENDED ALLIED DRAFTING GROUP HAVE GIVEN ALL THE ALLIES THE OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE WORK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AVOIDING THUS FAR

COMPLAINTS FROM SMALLER ALLIES THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE GOING ON BEYOND THE REACH OF THEIR INFLUENCE. THIS PROBLEM MAY ARISE, HOWEVER, AS NEGOTIATIONS GET DOWN TO SPECIFICS AND MORE LIMITED FORUMS ARE REQUIRED TO SUPPLEMENT PLENARY SESSIONS.

5. SOVIET POSITIONS AND INTERESTS. THE ACTIONS OF THE SOVIETS TO DATE HAVE INDICATED A CERTAIN SERIOUSNESS OF APPROACH AND A DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE A FORCE REDUCTION AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH ONE ON THEIR LINES. THE SOVIETS DISPUTE THE WESTERN ARGUMENT THAT EXISTING DISPARITIES FAVOR THE WARSAW PACT. THEY HAVE ARGUED THAT ANY EASTERN ADVANTAGES DUE TO GEOGRAPHY OR TANK STRENGTH ARE MORE THAN COMPENSTATED BY WESTERN ADVANTAGES IN AIR POWER AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO CLAIMED THAT SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS ARE MORE DIRECTLY AT STAKE THAN THOSE OF THE US, IMPLYING THAT THE USSR'S LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS JUSTIFY A LARGER SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA FOR REDUCTIONS.

6. THE SOVIETS SEEM INTERESTED IN SPEEDY NEGOTIATIONS PRODUCING TANGIBLE RESULTS WITHIN A YEAR, THUS MEETING THE TIME SCHEDULE SET BY BREZHNEV IN HIS OCT 26 SPEECH TO THE WORLD PEACE CONGRESS IN MOSCOW. THE EASTERN DRAFT REDUCTION AGREEMENT AND SOVIET ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF IT, AND BILATERAL SOVIET COMMENTS, HAVE HIGHLIGHTED A NUMBER OF PRIORITY SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ARE: (A) NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO EQUAL PERCENTAGE CUTS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE; (B) INCLUSION OF NATIONAL FORCES IN REDUCTIONS, PARTICULARLY THE BUNDESWEHR, WITH THE APPARENT INTENT OF CONSTRAINING THE WEST EUROPEAN  
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CONVENTIONAL FORCE CONSIDERED MOST POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING BY THE SOVIETS: (C) AT THE SAME TIME INHIBITING WEST EUROPEAN PROGRESS TOWARD DEFENSE COOPERATION IN WHICH WEST GERMANY COULD HAVE A MAJOR ROLE; AND (D) INCLUSION IN REDUCTIONS OF AIRCRAFT AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO GET AT WESTERN CAPABILITIES THE SOVIETS CONSIDER MOST THREATENING. TACTICALLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE MANEUVERED TO MINIMIZE CONSIDERATION OF ANY "ASSOCIATED MEASURES" AND HAVE STAKED OUT THEIR PREFERENCE FOR VERIFICATION OF AGREEMENTS PURELY BY NATIONAL MEANS. THEY ALSO TRY TO EVEN OUT EAST-WEST DISPARITIES IN THE MANPOWER BASE BY ARGUING FOR INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER AND BY NOTING THAT WHEREAS THE EAST EMPLOYS SOLDIERS FOR MANY ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT TASKS,

THE WEST EMPLOYS MANY CIVILIANS IN SIMILAR ROLES.  
THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN FAIRLY CAREFUL TO STAY  
GENERALLY WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS REGARDING THE  
CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE TALKS, LEAKING THEIR PROPOSAL

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L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 AEC-11 IO-14 EB-11 OIC-04

OMB-01 AECE-00 DRC-01 /175 W

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P R 141616Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1029

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 43

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

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FROM U.S. REP MBFR

CAUTIOUSLY -- AND INEFFECTIVELY -- AND THEN WAITING TO  
PUBLICLY COMPARE THE ESTERN AND WESTERN PROPOSALS  
UNTIL AFTER THEY COULD QUOTE THE WESTERN PRESS AS  
THE SOURCE OF THEIR INFORMATION.

7. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN FEW DEVIATIONS FROM  
A STRICT DEFENSE OF THEIR OWN APPROACH IN PLENARY  
SESSIONS, THE SOVIETS HAVE SUGGESTED FLEXIBILITY ON  
SOME ISSUES IN BILATERAL CONTACTS, MOST IMPORTANTLY  
CONCERNING THE ALLIED CONCEPT OF PHASING. IN  
SEVERAL BILATERAL CONTACTS, THE SOVIETS HAVE

SHOWN WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE THE CONCEPT OF BEGINNING  
NEGOTIATIONS WITH A FOCUS ON U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND  
FORCES. THEY HAVE PROBED EXTENSIVELY CONCERNING THE  
LINK THAT THE ALLIES WOULD ESTABLISH BETWEEN THE  
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FIRST PHASE FOCUS ON U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES AND THE  
SECOND PHASE WHERE FORCES OF ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS  
WOULD BE ADDRESSED. REMARKS OF SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES  
INDICATE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD REQUIRE  
A LINK IN BOTH SUBSTANCE AND TIMING BETWEEN THE TWO  
PHASES, TO ENSURE THE NATIONAL FORCES WOULD NOT BE  
OMITTED. THEIR PRESENT ASKING PRICE, IS A FIRM  
ADVANCE AGREEMENT ON A PACKAGE CONSISTING OF GENERAL DIMENSIONS  
OF REDUCTIONS OF FORCES IN BOTH PHASES INCLUDING NATIONAL FORCES,  
DATE WHEN IMPLEMENTATION OF SECOND PHASE WOULD BEGIN, FIRST-  
PHASE REDUCTIONS BY EQUAL NUMBERS, AND INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR AND  
AIR FORCES FROM THE OUTSET.

8. EAST EUROPEAN POSITIONS AND INTERESTS. THE EAST  
EUROPEAN DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO STRAY  
FROM THE SOVIET LINE, ALTHOUGH NATIONAL PRESENTATIONS  
IN PLENARY SESSIONS HAVE HAD SOME NATIONAL FLAVOR.  
THE PRIMARY CONCERN OF THE EAST EUROPEAN DELEGATIONS  
SEEMS TO BE TO ENSURE THAT NATIONAL FORCES ARE  
INCLUDED, BOTH TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE BUNDESWEHR AND  
TO SHARE THEMSELVES IN THE FRUITS OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT.  
OF MOSCOW'S SIX WARSAW PACT COLLEAGUES, THE PLES, EAST  
GERMANS, AND ROMANIANS HAVE PLAYED THE MOST DISTINCTIVE  
ROLES. THE EAST GERMANS HAVE CONSISTENTLY TAKEN A  
HARDER LINE THAN EVEN THE SOVIETS, BOTH IN PLENARY  
AND IN BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS. THE PLES, ON THE  
OTHER HAND, ARE THE ONES TO LOOK TO FOR EXPERTISE, IN-  
TEREST IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS,  
AND FOR ON OCCASION SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY IN  
THE EASTERN POSITION. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE  
POLISH SPEECH TO THE 5 DECEMBER PLENARY, POLISH REP  
STRULAK DELIVERED THE FIRST FORMAL EASTERN HINTS OF  
POTENTIAL FLEXIBILITY ON THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE FIRST  
AND SECOND PHASES OF THE WESTERN APPROACH. THE  
ROMANIANS HAVE STAKED OUT AN INDEPENDENT STANCE AS

EXPECTED, BUT THEY HAVE BEEN CAREFUL SO FAR NOT  
SERIOUSLY TO OFFEND THE SOVIETS OR TO DISRUPT THE  
TALKS.

9. ALLIED POSITIONS AND INTERESTS. THE ALLIES IN  
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VIENNA HAVE MAINTAINED A HIGH DEGREE OF SOLIDARITY  
THROUGH THIS FIRST PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS,  
EVEN THOUGH WELL-KNOW DIFFERENCES LIE  
JUST BELOW THE SURFACE. THIS COHESION CAN BE  
EXPLAINED IN PART BY THE FACT THAT THE WORK OF  
THESE PAST WEEKS HAS LARGELY BEEN PRESENTATION AND  
ELABORATION OF A POSITION WHICH HAD BEEN THOROUGHLY  
DEBATED AND COORDINATED IN NATO, AND WITHOUT THE  
TENSION OF THE DEBATE OVER HUNGARY WHICH AROSE  
AT THE OUTSET OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS. THUS,  
AGREED WORDING AND APPROACHES FOR THIS STAGE OF  
THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE RELATIVELY PAINLESSLY FOUND.  
NONETHELESS, THE GROUP REACTED WELL TO THE TABLING  
OF THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT AND INDIVIDUAL ALLIED  
REPS HAVE GENERALLY BEEN CAREFUL TO FOCUS BILATERAL  
CONVERSATIONS ON THE COORDINATED WESTERN APPROACH,  
RATHER THAN ARGUING ON THE BASIS OF THE EASTERN  
PROPOSAL. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SEN-  
SITIVITY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TALKS ABOUT EM-  
PHASIZING THE U.S.- SOVIET FOCUS OF THE ALLIED FIRST  
PHASE, MOST MEMBERS OF THE GROUP HAVE COME TO BELIEVE  
THAT PURSUING THIS FOCUS MAY NOW BE THE BEST WAY TO  
GET THE OTHER SIDE TO TALK ON THE BASIS OF THE  
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P R 141616Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1030

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS

ALL MBFR MISSIONS 44

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 VIENNA 10347

FROM US REP MBFR

ASSOCIATED MEASURES THAT WOULD PREVENT REDUCTIONS  
IN THE CENTRAL AREA FROM RESULTING IN AN  
INCREASED THREAT TO THE FLANKS.

13. WHERE THE NEGOTIATIONS STAND. THE TWO SIDES  
NOW HAVE PRESENTED AND DEFENDED FORMAL PROPOSALS  
WHICH DIFFER CONSIDERABLY. THE MAJOR PHILOSOPHICAL  
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO APPROACHES IS THAT  
THE EAST PROCEEDS FROM THE EXISTING FORCE RELATION-  
SHIP WHICH IT CLAIMS HAS PROVED TO BE ADEQUATE.  
IT MAINTAINS THAT THIS RELATIONSHIP  
SHOULD NOT BE ALTERED BY REDUCTIONS. THE WEST  
MAINTAINS THAT THE EXISTING DISPARITIES IN CON-  
VENTIONAL GROUND FORCES AND IN GEOGRAPHY IN THE  
AREA FAVOR THE WARSAW PACT AND ARE POTENTIALLY

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DESTABILIZING. THE TWO APPROACHES ALSO DIFFER  
ON MOST MAJOR POINTS:

A. FORCES TO BE REDUCED: IN CONTRAST TO  
NATO, THE EAST PROPOSES TO REDUCE FOREIGN AND  
NATIONAL FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY FROM THE OUTSET;  
THE EAST ALSO PROPOSES INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR  
AND AIR FORCES.

B. COMMON CEILING: WHILE NATO SEEKS TO  
ESTABLISH A COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES,  
THE EAST MAINTAINS THAT THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP  
OF FORCES IN THE AREA MUST BE PRESERVED.

C. PHASING: ALTHOUGH THE EASTERN DRAFT  
AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RE-  
DUCTIONS IN STAGES, IT PROPOSES ONLY ONE NEGOTIATING  
PHASE WHEREAS THE WEST PROPOSES TWO SUCCESSIVE  
NEGOTIATING PHASES.

D. ASSOCIATED MEASURES: THE EASTERN SIDE IS  
RELUCTANT TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF ASSOCIATED  
MEASURES. THE WEST HAS GENERALLY PROPOSED THAT  
ASSOCIATED MEASURES BE AGREED TO BUILD CONFIDENCE  
IN AGREEMENTS REACHED, AND TO PROVIDE FOR  
NONCIRCUMVENTION AND VERIFICATION. THE WEST - WHILE  
RESERVING THE RIGHT TO PROPOSE FURTHER MEASURES -  
HAS TABLED FOUR SPECIFIC MEASURES TO APPLY TO US AND

SOVIET FORCES. THESE ARE: PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVEMENTS INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS INCLUDING ROTATIONS; PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAJOR EXERCISES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS; LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE, NUMBER, AND DURATION OF EXERCISES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS; AND, EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

14. THE LAST WEEK OF NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE MID-DECEMBER BREAK TENDED TO EMPHASIZE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO APPROACHES, AS BOTH SIDES CLOSED WITH FIRM STATEMENTS OF THEIR ARGUMENTS. DURING THE PLENARY SESSION ON DEC. 11, THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REP (KLEIN) DELIVERED

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THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE AND NEGATIVE CRITIQUE HEARD YET OF ALLIED INTENTIONS TO PROPOSE "ASSOCIATED MEASURES." DURING THE SAME SESSION, WEST GERMAN REP BEHREND'S PRESENTED THE FOUR INITIAL ALLIED PROPOSALS FOR ASSOCIATED MEASURES. CLOSING OUT THE TALKS ON DEC. 13, THE SOVIETS (KHLESTOV) AND BELGIAN (ADRIAENSSEN) REPS SUMMED UP THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES. THE SOVIET SPEECH WAS A RATHER UNYIELDING CRITIQUE OF THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. KHLESTOV CHARACTERIZED THE GENERAL CONDUCT OF THE TALKS IN A POSITIVE WAY, BUT CLAIMED THAT NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSALS ATTEMPTED TO GAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES AND WERE NOT CONSISTENT ON MANY POINTS WITH THE JUNE 28 COMMUNIQUE WHICH MARKED THE END OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS.

15. IN SPITE OF THESE RATHER CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCES, THE COURSE OF THE LAST FEW WEEKS OF NEGOTIATIONS APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT THERE MAY BE SUFFICIENT TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY IN THE SOVIET POSITION TO BRING THEM TO ACCEPT A STARTING POINT FOR SPECIFIC NEGOTIATING WHICH COULD BE TO US ADVANTAGE. SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES HAVE INDICATED IN BILATERAL CONTACTS THAT THEY MIGHT CONSIDER AN INITIAL FOCUS ON US AND SOVIET FORCES IF THEY WERE ASSURED THAT NATIONAL FORCES REDUCTIONS WOULD ALSO BE NEGOTIATED. THESE BILATERAL INDICATIONS HAVE BEEN BUTTRESSED BY THE POLISH STATEMENT IN THE PLENARY OF DECEMBER 5 WHICH ALSO HINTED AT SUCH WILLINGNESS. IF THE ALLIES DECIDE TO PURSUE THIS OPENING, THEY MIGHT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THE FIRST MOVE TOWARD BRINGING THE SOVIETS TO SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF US-SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS. MOWINCKEL

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